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Abstract
How does political competition among domestic actors influence foreign policy choice?
Studies examining this question often focus on the role of economic or partisan interests, and
how they influence the preferences civilian decision-makers who are subject to the electoral
pressures of their constituents. Less attention has been paid to how the preferences of other in-
fluential, unelected, actors influence state behavior. I examine the influence of one such group
by looking at how the preferences of American military leaders shape decisions on American
military spending and force structure. Using tools from the field of network analysis, I find
support for the idea that military leaders occupying key positions can influence defense spend-
ing priorities in favor of their respective branches. Results also show how the influence of
military leaders has changed over time, and is conditional upon the institutions governing the
relationships between civilian decision-makers and military leaders.
Keywords: Foreign policy, Military Spending, Domestic politics and international relations,
military leaders.
“I do want your input, but I want your advice as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not as individual
Service Chiefs scrabbling for the biggest piece of pie in this operation.”
— General Tommy Franks
“‘Washington is a Navy town, and it always has been,’ Garner replied. But wait a minute, I
pressed during one of several discussions. The top soldier in the whole country, the chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikiashvili, is an Army Man. ‘Never helps,’ Garner Replied.
‘An Army chairman of the Chiefs says how bad can I stick my service to prove that I’m a purple
guy? If you make a Navy or Air Force guy the chairman, he’s the most parochial SOB you’ve
ever seen in your life.’”
— (Wilson 2000, 53)
How does political competition between domestic interests impact a state’s foreign policy
choices? To date, a significant body of research, much of it focusing on the United States, has
examined how various domestic interests, such as partisan or economic interests, have shaped the
preferences of domestic actors in democratic states and, in turn, influenced the state’s actions in
the international sphere. Fordham (1998) and Clark (2003) have shown how partisanship interacts
with economic factors in affecting decisions to use military force by the United States. Arena &
Palmer (2009) have similarly examined how such factors influence decisions on the use of military
force in other democratic states. Fordham (2002) has examined how the preferences of Repub-
licans and Democrats over macroeconomic policy have influenced decisions related to military
force structure. Similarly, Milner & Tingley (2010) have shown how partisanship and economic
incentives influence Congressional voting patterns on issues related to foreign aid and free trade.
While such studies have enhanced our understanding of the domestic sources of foreign policy
choice, they invariably focus on the divergent incentives of elected officials representing different
societal interests. However, these elected officials represent only a portion of the policymaking
process. Indeed, beyond this “first” layer of elected policymakers lies an additional layer of actors
who also play an important role in both crafting and executing foreign policy. Key players in
the policymaking process, like the military, are conspicuously absent in studies examining foreign
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policy choice. The absence of such players is in empirical studies is particularly striking given the
preeminent position that conflict studies has attained in the field of international relations.
This article seeks to address this gap in two ways: First, I examine the influence that American
military leaders exert on defense policy outcomes. Specifically, this project will seek to move be-
yond the first layer of the decision-making process to examine the ways in which senior military
officers are able to compete with one another to influence defense spending priorities. Several
scholars and former policymakers have discussed the inter-service rivalries that are alleged to pre-
vail in the American military (e.g. Lowi 1963, Wilson 2000, Nagl 2002, Franks 2004, Halperin,
Clapp & Kanter 2007). This literature typically views military leaders as myopically pursuing the
interests of their respective branch of the military. This backdrop provides a convenient context
in which to examine the potential for lower-level officials to influence broader policy outcomes.
Furthermore, the United States since the end of World War II provides a solid case on which to
focus given its position as a global military superpower and the central role that military leaders
have come to play in foreign policymaking.
Second, this analysis will examine how the influence of senior military leaders has been af-
fected by changes in the institutions governing their relations with elected civilian policymakers.
Although we typically tend to focus on institutions such as parliamentary or presidential systems
when examining institutional influences on foreign policy choice (see Reiter & Tillman 2002,
Leblang & Chan 2003, Clark & Nordstrom 2005), there are additional institutional constraints to
consider. Such institutional factors determine the ability of lower-level political actors to influence
policy by establishing their role in the policymaking process, and by determining their level of
access to civilian decision-makers.
Such issues are important in determining how the military capabilities of states are shaped by
their domestic political landscapes, and consequently, the opportunities in which military force
may be applied. For example, during the buildup to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, officials
in President George W. Bush’s administration became frustrated by the inability of the American
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military to mobilize in a relatively short period of time (Woodward 2002). Problems related to
spending priorities and force structure presented further difficulties in the aftermaths of these in-
vasions; the Army, strained by its lack of personnel, attempted to recruit personnel from the other
branches of the military in order to meet its need for more soldiers (Schmitt 2004). The duration
and costs of these wars have even led Defense Secretary Robert Gates to explicitly call on poli-
cymakers and military officials to rethink the balance between the branches of America’s military.
Gates argues that in the future, less emphasis must be placed on the Army and its large mechanized
divisions, and greater emphasis on air and sea power, when it comes to how America responds to
crises abroad (Shanker 2011).
Furthermore, the potential for military leaders to influence defense spending priorities in favor
of their respective branches provides important insights into the national security policymaking
process and helps to unpack some of the dynamics involved in the delegation of responsibilities
from civilian leaders to military officials. It also suggests something important about the degree
to which national security is something that can be objectively defined—if the evidence indicates
that even elements of the military disagree over how best to approach the state’s national security
needs, it stands to reason that other organizational, political, or economic factors may contribute
to shaping different preferences and perceptions of domestic actors over matters related to national
security.
This paper will proceed as follows: First, I will review the anecdotal evidence as it pertains to
inter-service rivalries. Second, in order to build upon the arguments found in the qualitative liter-
ature, and to clarify how inter-service competition translates into influence with civilian decision-
makers, I draw on bureaucratic politics theory to help generate more refined expectations regarding
the behavior and incentives of military leaders. The third section will review the data used in this
study and the operationalization of the variables. Finally I will conclude with a discussion of the
results and suggestions for future research.
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Inter-Service Rivalries
The National Security Act of 1947 was partly intended to rein in what many civilian leaders saw
as the excessive competition between the different branches of the military. It sought to unify the
previously independent service branches into a single organization under a single civilian secre-
tary. Many military and civilian leaders were appalled by the lack of coordination and excessive
competition that they saw during World War II. “We must never fight another war the way we
fought the last two,” said President Truman, “I have the feeling that if the Army and the Navy had
fought our enemies as hard as they fought each other, the war would have ended much earlier,”
(Clifford 1991).
The process of unifying and restructuring the military brought about resistance by those mili-
tary officials who feared the effects of the potential changes. Many in the Navy’s leadership, for
example, fiercely resisted the proposed changes, believing that the restructuring process would
strip the Navy of some of its most important assets, such as its air power and the Marine Corps,
thereby relegating it to a transportation role for the other branches. The growth in the Army and
Army-Air Corps during the Second World War led many in the Navy’s leadership to believe that
the Navy’s much smaller ground forces and its carrier-based aviation arm would be eliminated
to concentrate these functions in other branches. James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, op-
posed unification on these grounds, claiming that it would be “fatal” for the Navy (Stevenson 2008,
130).
The advent of the atomic bomb created additional competition between the branches of the
military. Despite the early recognition by some civilian and military leaders that atomic weapons
would serve very little practical use aside from their deterrent effect, some military leaders were
fearful that the new weapon would hurt their branch’s standing in the defense community. Army
officers, for instance, were worried that a growing emphasis on nuclear weaponry would lead to
severe cuts in the Army’s budget and manpower since the newly founded Air Force had the clearest
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linkage with the delivery of nuclear weapons prior to the development of inter-continental ballistic
missiles and smaller tactical nuclear weapons (Halperin, Clapp & Kanter 2007). Indeed, these fears
were validated as civilian leaders (particularly Republicans) preferred the less expensive nuclear
weapons to larger and more expensive conventional forces in deterring the Soviet threat (Isaacson
& Thomas 1986, Fordham 2002).
Although the early Cold War period could be dismissed as unique given the unprecedented
amount of restructuring that was taking place in America’s defense community, there is ample ev-
idence suggesting that such competitive dynamics have persisted in a consistent fashion over the
past 60 years. Although initially emphasizing its ability to wield nuclear weapons, the Air Force
gradually lost its edge as advancements in both nuclear weaponry and delivery technology allowed
the other branches of the service to play a greater role in the nuclear game. The development of
smaller more portable tactical nuclear weapons, and the development of smaller missile-based nu-
clear delivery systems, allowed the Army to become a more serious competitor in the application of
America’s nuclear arsenal in the field. Similarly, development in submarine and missile technology
allowed nuclear missiles to be deployed on Navy submarines (Halperin, Clapp & Kanter 2007).
Such changes threatened to reduce the Air Force’s share of the defense budget, which would in turn
have an affect on the career ambitions and influence of several high ranking Air Force officers.
Even during the Vietnam War, inter-service rivalry is viewed as having affected America’s
approach to waging war. As some scholars have argued, the effect of World War II was to solidify
a particular vision of each branch’s mission within its organizational culture (Nagl 2002, Halperin,
Clapp & Kanter 2007). Nagl’s (2002) account of the Army’s efforts to combat the insurgency in
Vietnam highlight the extent to which it attempted to frame operations in such a way that would
justify its leading role in the conflict. The Army’s expanding role in Vietnam was coming on the
heels of the Eisenhower administration, wherein conventional forces had been scaled back in favor
of strategic nuclear forces—the “lean years of massive retaliation” for the Army (Nagl 2002, 126).
Nagl goes on to describe more fully the extent to which Army leaders resisted implementing any
5
changes that would potentially give other branches a greater role. For example, the Army fiercely
resisted changes proposed by the Marine Corps, as the Marine Corps’ proposed counter-insurgency
program would have conflicted sharply with the Army’s preferred methods of waging war, and may
have threatened the Army’s dominant position.
Inter-service rivalries have continued to be an issue of concern since the end of the Cold War.
The military downsizing that accompanied the fall of the Soviet Union forced military leaders to
fight to stave off cuts to their respective branches. Franklin Spinney, a former Air Force officer and
civilian program analyst at the Department of Defense in the 1990s, perhaps articulated the issue
best, arguing that the problem of inter-service rivalry stems from the fact that service chiefs think
“they’re in a zero-sum game. They think that if they cancel something like the F-22, some other
service...will take that money,” (Wilson 2000, 184). Spinney went on to remark on the difficulties
civilian officials have had in trying to restrain inter-service competition in the context of military
spending, saying that military leaders have “risen up through some thirty years of infighting. No
matter what kind of warriors they may be, they’re smart and understand the bureaucracy of the
American military. Political appointees are no match for these service chiefs and the bureaucracies
they control.” (Wilson 2000, 184–185).
Wilson’s (2000) interviews with high ranking military officers further support the perception
that military leaders fiercely compete with one another to influence policy. When asked how the
American military needed to change in the post-Cold War world, Marine Corps Commandant
Charles Krulak argued that the Army needed to scale back drastically; that its heavy armored
divisions were far too slow to deploy and were not practical when the future would require forces
capable of fighting protracted “three-block” wars in urban population centers. Similarly, he argued
that the Air Force should scale back its emphasis on air power and focus more on space and
cyber warfare. Alternatively, Krulak defended the Navy’s large carrier-based fleets as essential in
rapidly deploying ground and air forces abroad. He also defended the Marine Corps’ controversial
V-22 Osprey program as important in rapidly deploying and extracting small forces in combat
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zones. Predictably, Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner saw the Osprey as an enormous waste of
resources as it was only capable of carrying a small team of soldiers and could not carry heavier
equipment and cargo loads comparable to existing helicopters used by the Army.
During the buildup to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, General Tommy Franks, then Commander-
in-Chief (CINC) of US Central Command, described his experiences with the various service
chiefs as marred by parochialism. During a meeting with the service chiefs and Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, Franks presented Central Commands’ plans for the invasion of Afghanistan.
Franks later complained that the chiefs used the meeting as an opportunity to petition the secretary
for a greater role for their particular service and that they were not focused on the invasion as being
a joint military operation. According to Franks, Michael Ryan, the Air Force Chief of Staff, tore
apart Franks’ proposed plans, arguing that a greater emphasis on air power was needed. Similarly,
Marine Corps Commandant James Jones argued for an expanded role for amphibious forces in the
operation. Later (and in person) Franks blasted General Jones and Chief of Naval Operations Vern
Clark for using a war-planning session to jockey for influence (Franks 2004). Franks’ feelings are
summed up nicely in the following passage:
I had spent thirty-five years trying to work around the problem of service parochial-
ism; now, as a CINC, I saw how that kind of narrow thinking had affected even the
highest levels of military planning. As I worked out force requirements for CENT-
COM [Central Command], it became obvious that each of the services was focused on
winning wars—alone [sic]. They were funded as independent entities, and had no real
inclination to fight together [sic] as part of a joint team (Franks 2004, 207).
The history of inter-service relations suggests that the prevailing attitude among military lead-
ers has been one of blind obedience to their respective services, taking every opportunity to ad-
vance their branch’s cause to civilian policymakers. And while there is ample anecdotal evidence
asserting that this is the case, there is very little empirical evidence examining the effects of such in-
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fighting and whether or not military leaders can indeed influence policy outcomes. Rhodes (1994)
provides one of the only quantitative tests of these claims in his examination of the three unions
of the U.S. Navy.1 Framing his argument in terms of the bureaucratic politics literature, Rhodes
finds little support for the idea that the service background of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
influences spending priorities. However, Rhodes’ study fails to account for the fact that there are
several actors in any organizational hierarchy that are positioned to influence policy. Failing to
account for the influence of these other actors does not provide an accurate basis on which to judge
the general influence such officials may or may not exercise in policymaking.
Bureaucratic Politics and Inter-Service Rivalries
The anecdotal evidence outlined above is a useful starting point, but it is insufficient for generating
more precise hypotheses. Turning to the bureaucratic politics literature provides a more solid
theoretical framework in which to develop expectations regarding the means by which military
leaders influence policy. I will first briefly outline the important elements of bureaucratic politics
theory, and will then proceed to detail the ways in which the anecdotal evidence can be incorporated
to generate testable hypotheses.
Bureaucratic Politics Theory
Bureaucratic politics theory sees policy choice as the product of interactions between several dif-
ferent actors. The actors themselves are individuals, typically defined according to their roles
within particular organizations, and the organizations themselves existing within a broader orga-
nizational structure.2 The position that an individual actor holds determines the sorts of powers
that are available to that actor, and also shapes that actor’s preferences and views over a variety of
policy issues.
1The three unions Rhodes examines are the surface fleet, submarine fleet, and aviators.
2It should be noted that actors need not hold official positions or offices within the larger organization, such as
Secretary of Defense or State, to be influential in the policymaking process.
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What an actor cares about and the goals that they are trying to pursue are often influenced by
(if not outright defined by) their position and the organizations to which they belong. Scholars of
bureaucratic politics have discussed the notion that organizational missions or mandates serve to
inform an individual’s sense of broader goals (Allison 1969, Allison & Halperin 1972, Allison &
Zelikow 1999, Moe 1989, Betts 1991, Halperin, Clapp & Kanter 2007).3 For example, the armed
forces come to view national security through the lens of military power, and the individual services
come to view national security through the lens of their own service’s well-being. According to
Allison and Halperin:
Members of an organization, particularly career officials, come to believe that the
health of their organization is vital to the national interest. The health of their organi-
zation, in turn, is seen to depend on maintaining influence fulfilling its mission, and
securing the necessary capabilities. The latter two interests lead to concern for main-
taining autonomy and...maintaining or increasing budgets. (Allison & Halperin 1972,
48)
An actor’s position is important not only because it contributes to shaping preferences, but
because it also determines an actor’s power to influence policy choice. Position is a relative term
derived from an actor’s stance vis-a-vis a variety of other players, agencies, and interests. Po-
sition within a hierarchy is emphasized as it relates to what Allison (Allison 1969, Allison &
Zelikow 1999) refers to as “action-channels,” or the rules that determine the regularized pathways
of communication and input into the policymaking process. Action-channels, “vest and weight par-
ticular interests and perspectives by distributing formal powers, information, access, and bargain-
ing advantages to players with predictable predispositions in regularized policymaking processes,”
3This view is also accepted by scholars concerned with the role played by epistemic, or expertise-based commu-
nities (E.g. Haas 1992). Scholars have argued that groups of individuals with specialized knowledge and expertise
in particular areas come to view their interests and broader goals in the context of their particular area of specializa-
tion. Furthermore, it is argued that these groups seek to advance their interests and goals through the consolidation of
bureaucratic power.
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(Allison & Zelikow 1999, 5808). The head of a department must watch out for the well-being
of that department, and while lower ranking individuals within the department may share similar
views, their ability to influence policy is limited by their lower standing within the organization.
For example, it is usually the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, not the Vice-Chairman, that advises
the president on military and security issues.
Consequently we should expect positions closer to the top of an organization’s hierarchy to be
commensurate with greater power. This power ultimately stems from the senor official’s ability
to choose what information, transmitted up the organizational ladder, gets reported to decision-
makers. This is not to say that lower ranking officials do not have any power. Some scholars
have noted the fact that lower-ranking officials can influence decisions by influencing the flow of
information as it moves from the ground up (Hammond 1986, Allison & Zelikow 1999, Halperin,
Clapp & Kanter 2007). However, the power of any single actor to significantly influence policy
outcomes in this way should diminish as alternative sources of information increase, and higher
level officials still serve to filter and relay the final recommendations to decision-makers.
Finally, it is important to emphasize the ability of bureaucrats to influence policy decisions
even though bureaucratic actors may not necessarily be the ones who make the final decision.
As scholars of bureaucratic politics (Allison & Zelikow 1999, Betts 1991, Halperin, Clapp &
Kanter 2007), scholars of delegation (Epstein & O’Halloran 1999), and those scholars concerned
with the role played by epistemic communities (Haas 1992) have argued, power and authority may
be delegated in situations where the decision-makers themselves lack the expertise or resources to
make decisions. For example, although civilian officials within the executive and legislature have
a great deal of influence in the budgeting process, they are often unprepared to assess the needs of
particular agencies whose needs are determined by highly specialized experts. This is particularly
true concerning the military—while civilian officials may have served in the military, their service
was likely not long enough for them to develop the same breadth of knowledge as career officials.
In areas such as national security, it is possible that the power of the bureaucratic agents is further
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enhanced given the belief that civilian interference in military affairs is “playing politics” with
national security.
Applications to Military Leadership
Bureaucratic politics theory offers important insights into the dynamics that may be animating
inter-service competition. Indeed, the military provides an excellent test subject given its empha-
sis on rank, structure and hierarchy. After the Second World War and the American ascendency
to global hegemony, the guidance of career military officials became essential to civilian policy-
makers. The increasingly sophisticated nature of military weaponry and capabilities, combined
with America’s expanding global military commitments, have led to an increasing role for mili-
tary leaders. Indeed, some scholars have pointed to the increasing “militarization” of American
foreign policy during the Cold War era (Bacevich 2004, Bacevich 2009). Given the increasingly
complex nature of America’s role in international affairs has led military leaders to be important
provisioners of expertise on issues pertaining to American military capabilities and security con-
cerns. Senior military officials would thus seem to qualify as key players in the game of national
security.
For present purposes the actors in the model are individual military officers, and since theory
dictates that an actor’s interests are derived primarily from their membership within an organiza-
tion, we should expect these actors to use their positions to advance the interests of their respective
organizations. This means that Army officers should seek to advance the interests of the Army,
Navy officers the Navy, and so on. But bureaucratic politics theory leads us to expect that not all
military personnel have an equal opportunity to influence policy. Only those actors that occupy im-
portant positions within the military’s hierarchy should have this ability.4 Holding positions within
the broader organizational structure of the military gives these officers access to both opportunities
4I acknowledge that this is a simplifying assumption. There are enumerable informal channels through which
military officials might seek to influence policy. Such information channels are virtually impossible to identify and
model appropriately.
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and power. It is also important to recognize that there are inherently a limited number of such
positions available, thus limiting the number of advisors that are going to be involved in significant
decision-making processes.
Furthermore, as scholars have argued, the power of an actor or group to influence policy is
largely a function of the extent to which they can consolidate their power within a broader organi-
zational framework. I have already described the theoretical processes that dictate the preferences
held by actors and that the kind of information they are likely to give in an advisory capacity will
reflect organizational interests. However, for the purposes of this analysis we are really interested
in the aggregate effect of these individual actors working to advance their service’s interests. As a
logical extension, it holds that multiple actors holding the same preferences should be better able
to advance the cause of that organization than a single individual could. Given a limited number
of positions on which civilian leaders can call for expert military advice, the more positions that
are held by officers sharing a common organizational affiliation will effectively limit the variety of
information that is available. By holding a greater share of positions within the military hierarchy,
a particular branch of the military should subsequently have a greater ability to influence policy
outcomes—the efforts of these individual officers who share interests should be cumulative.
But power and control over the broader military organization are not simply a function of the
number of positions held—hierarchical considerations also matter. Power is not just a function
of how many positions an organization controls, but also how powerful those positions are. This
is especially important in the military as the chain of command determines the action-channels
through which officers can attempt to influence policy. Higher ranking officers, through their con-
trol of the information that flows up to top civilian policymakers, should have a greater ability to
influence policy than their subordinates. Since civilian leaders frequently consult a range of senior
military leaders on important issues, the ability to control information in this fashion is not perfect.
But the frequency with which the higher ranking officers interact with key civilian policymakers
should still be greater than that of lower ranking officers. To put it differently, an individual from
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one branch that occupies only one senior position might be able to advance the interests of their
particular branch just as, if not more, effectively than two officers from another branch who oc-
cupy more junior positions. Consequently, representation and hierarchical power come together
to determine a branch’s overall power, control of information and advice, or influence, within the
military hierarchy.
Hypothesis 1. The greater a branch’s control over the military hierarchy, the greater that branch’s
ability to influence policy.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCOS) is one such position that may be unique in its
ability to influence policy. As the top officer in the military the CJCOS is frequently consulted
by the president and Congress as the spokesmen for the entire uniformed military. Compared to
other senior positions the CJCOS is capable of engaging civilian policymakers on a more frequent
basis for reasons related to seniority, prominence, and geographic proximity. Thus, control over
this position might exert an independent effect.
Hypothesis 2. Holding the position of CJCOS is positively associated with a branch’s influence
on policy.
There are additional institutional and contextual factors to consider. Given the importance of
the chain of command and action-channels, it is essential to consider how institutional changes
have impacted the influence of different actors by altering these relationships. The Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1986 made important changes to the structure of the military and altered the chain
of command in crucial ways. Prior to the passage of this legislation the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
more directly involved in the chain of command for operational issues. Other high-ranking military
officers, such as the regional and functional combatant commanders (CINCs), had less opportunity
to express their views to senior civilian decision-makers. The Goldwater-Nichols Act changed to
chain of command to run directly from the CINCs to the Secretary of Defense and the President,
circumventing the Joint Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should act as a filter, suppressing the
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information flowing up from the CINCs prior to 1986, whereas after 1986 the CINCs should have
greater access to senior policymakers and thus a greater ability to influence policy.
Hypothesis 3. Greater control over the military’s hierarchy should have a positive effect on a
branch’s ability to influence policy in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era.
There is an additional possibility that runs counter to the previous hypothesis. So far it has
been assumed that an officer’s preferences are principally driven by their membership in one of
the branches of the military. This assumption is in line with most of the anecdotal accounts on the
matter. But aside from the service chiefs, the most important positions are the CINCs. Given that
the officers holding these positions are responsible for overseeing military operations that combine
equipment and personnel from all of the branches of the military, their otherwise more narrow
preferences might be altered as a result of their role as a commander of a unified force. Rather than
identifying themselves as an “Army man,” for example, they may come to see themselves more
as a representative of a wider range of interests. This possibility is supported by the theoretical
literature’s emphasis on position, as an individual’s position itself is partially defined by the duties
and responsibilities of the specific office that they hold (Allison & Zelikow 1999). There is also
some limited support for this idea in the anecdotal accounts of some senior military personnel
(Franks 2004).
If this is the case we should expect the post-Goldwater-Nichols era to allow these commanders
greater opportunities to express these preferences. In this case, preferences are influenced less
by organizational affiliation and more by the specific duties associated with an officer’s current
position. So even if one branch’s officers hold a majority of command positions, it would do
little to advance the cause of that branch since their officer’s positions are no longer solely defined
in terms of the branch to which they belong. Alternatively, it may in fact be the pre-Goldwater-
Nichols era where holding the majority of command positions matters more since the service chiefs
were better able to exercise operational control and could potentially bring their CINCs into line.
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Hypothesis 4. Greater control over the military’s hierarchy should have a positive effect on a
branch’s ability to influence policy before the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.
As an extension of this idea, the influence of the CJCOS should be lower in the post-Goldwater-
Nichols era. The Goldwater-Nichols Act took the CJCOS and the other service chiefs out of the
operational chain of command. The rise of the CINCs could be expected to come at the expense
of the service chiefs, and in particular, the CJCOS. Although Goldwater-Nichols established the
CJCOS as the principal military advisor to the president, the formal loss of influence in the opera-
tional chain of command may have seriously harmed the CJCOS’ ability to sway defense policy.
Hypothesis 5. Holding the position of CJCOS should be less influential in the post-Goldwater-
Nichols era, and more influential in the pre-Goldwater era.
Some military scholars have alternatively argued that the Goldwater-Nichols Act affected the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs differently than other positions. Bourne (1998) argues that Goldwater-
Nichols gave the Chairman increased power over military decisions—both managerial and opera-
tional. Although the legislation ostensibly elevates the power of the CINCs and lowers the power
of the CJCOS, Bourne states that the unofficial role of the Chairman in transmitting orders from
the president to CINCs has served to increase the Chairman’s influence.
Hypothesis 6. Holding the position of CJCOS should be more influential in the post-Goldwater-
Nichols era, and less influential in the pre-Goldwater era.
Having outlined the theoretical expectations and specific hypotheses, I now move on to discuss
the data used and operationalization of the variables of interest.
Data and Operationalization
The goal of this project is to examine the influence of the competition among military leaders on
actual policy outcomes. In order to determine whether or not these claims are accurate, I conduct a
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series of statistical analyses wherein I examine the link between the extent of each branch’s control
in the military’s hierarchical structure and its influence on policy outcomes.
Operationalizing Influence
In order to calculate the influence that each branch of the military has within the broader military
hierarchy I utilize techniques drawn from the field of network analysis. The primary variables
of interest are intended to capture the extent to which each branch of the service is positioned to
exert influence on the policymaking process. As such, the unit of observation is the branch-year.
To capture these dynamics I model the military’s hierarchy as a two-mode network wherein each
branch of the military is connected to a set of officially defined positions within the military’s
organizational hierarchy via the individual officers that actually occupy these positions.5 A branch
is connected to an office by having one of its officers occupying that position in a given year. Since
we are assuming that individual military officers seek to advance the interests of their respective
branch as the literature indicates, I treat the individual officers as proxies for the ability of a branch
to dominate the overall military hierarchy.
The first step is to define the theoretical boundaries of the network. As discussed in the theo-
retical section, we are only concerned with specific, officially defined positions within an organi-
zation. In order to generate the necessary measures it is important to set specific limitations on the
positions to be included in the network. In establishing these limits I include only the following po-
sitions: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCOS), Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (VCJCOS), and
Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the various functional and geographic commands—also known
as combatant commands. These positions were chosen because they fit with the criteria established
by the theoretical literature, and serve as the most important and highest ranking positions in the
American military that weigh-in on operational and personnel related issues.6
5Two-mode networks, while common in the social network analysis literature, have seen less use in the field of
political science. See Wasserman & Faust (1994) and Kolaczyk (2009) for more on modeling two-mode networks.
For a discussion of centrality in two-mode networks, see Faust (1997).
6Trask & Goldberg (1997) was used as the primary source for gathering information on military leaders occupying
16
Furthermore, although the American military is composed of four branches, positions like the
CJCOS or CINCs are typically held by officers from different branches over time.7 Whereas
the Chief of Naval Operations is always a Navy officer, a CINC can be drawn from any of the
four branches. Furthermore, these positions provide for variation in the structure of the military
hierarchy; as some positions are phased out and new ones created we can capture the fluctuations
in relative influence that each branch has by capturing the variation in opportunities to exercise
that influence. The creation of a new position can potentially change the balance of power between
competing service branches by creating new opportunities for a branch to dominate the flow of
information to civilian policymakers.8
To operationalize each branch’s influence within the broader military hierarchy I calculate two
different measures of degree centrality for each branch of the military from 1948 through 2009.
These centrality measures are a modification of the basic degree centrality measure which is de-
signed to capture the extent to which an individual actor is connected to other actors within a
network. These connections are referred to as ties.9 This measure is simply a count of the number
of ties that one actor has within a network, and is defined as follows:




Let us assume that there are 12 positions in the military hierarchy. Degree centrality would measure
the number of offices held by each individual branch of the service. If Army officers held 3 of these
12 positions, then the Army’s degree centrality score would be 3. Since the number of positions
these key leadership positions. However, this source only covers military leaders through 1997. Information on
officials holding key positions from 1997 through the present can be obtained in the United States Government Manual
for those years (see Office of the Federal Register Various Years).
7Since the budgetary data used in this paper is only available for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, I treat members
of the Marine Corps as members of the Navy.
8Given that the individual service chiefs, as particular positions, remain constant across time, I do not include them
in the centrality measures generated to capture a branch’s influence.
9While there are multiple alternative measures of centrality, degree centrality was chosen because it is the most
theoretically relevant of the alternatives. For more information on alternative measures of centrality, please see
(Wasserman & Faust 1994, Kolaczyk 2009)
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Degree centrality does have weaknesses that limit its applications for this project. The primary
limitation is that it only calculates the number of positions that a branch of the military holds, but
does not take into account the variation in power that may be associated with each of the individual
positions. For example, we may expect the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to be more powerful than
the Vice-Chairman.10 Degree centrality would treat the relative influence of all of these positions
equally, and there are solid reasons to expect that this is not the case.
To remedy this problem I draw on recent work by Opsahl, Agneessens & Skvoretz (2010) and
their weighted degree centrality measure to account for the strength of individual positions, as well
as the number of connections a branch has. This measure is calculated as follows:








Where CwαD (i) represents the weighted degree centrality measure of actor i, conditional upon a
tuning parameter, α. And where ki and si represent the total number of ties and average strength
of ties for actor i, respectively. As can be seen in the formula above, as α increases more emphasis
is placed on the strength of an actor’s ties, as represented by sαi .
11
To clarify, α represents a parameter by which the the influence of the number of ties an actor
10For the purposes of this paper I code the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as having a power of “3”, the
Vice-Chairman as “2”, and the combatant commanders as “1”. It could be argued that the changes imposed by the
Goldwater-Nichols Act suggest a change in the power scores would be in order. However, I hold these scores constant
across the entire time span covered by the data set. I believe this is in order given that the relative frequency with
which these positions interact with senior decision-makers, as well as their geographic proximity to the centers of
decision-making, suggest that there remain disparities in the extent to which field commanders have the ability and
opportunity to influence policy outcomes.
11For the purposes of this paper I fix α at a value of 0.5. Changing the value of alpha to .25 or .75 does not alter
the significance levels of the results. It should also be noted that I use the standardized degree centrality measure
described above for ki in order to address the concerns described above regarding the temporal variation in the number
of positions and the implication for relative influence.
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has and the strength of those ties is weighted. An α of 0 would generate a measure that is equal
to a traditional degree centrality statistic, as it places all of the emphasis on k(1−α)i term, which
is the total number of connections actor i has. Increasing α would begin to shift more of the
emphasis to the strength of an actor’s ties, thus placing less emphasis on the number of actor ties.
In substantive terms: α = 0 would treat the number of command positions held by each branch as
the most important factor. Alternatively, α = 1.5 makes the strength of ties more important than
the number of ties, discounting the influence of an actor’s overall presence within the network.
*** Figure 1 about here ***
To provide a more substantive feel for the weighted centrality measures used here, figure 1
depicts how the changes in the proportion of total positions held, and variations in the average
power of those positions, affects the weighted centrality measure. Controlling half of the available
positions can result in a weighted centrality score ranging from approximately .70 to 1.0, depending
on the average power associated with the positions held. In the case of the current arrangement of
military offices examined here, a branch would have to control 6 of 12 positions to hold half of the
available offices. Depending on the power associated with those offices, the weighted centrality
measure will give that branch a score of at least .70.
Additional Variables
In order to analyze the influence a branch is poised to exert on policy, I use two different mea-
sures of military spending as dependent variables. The first variable is each branch’s obligational
authority, adjusted for inflation.12. As an alternative dependent variable I also use each branch’s
procurement spending. Using a second spending category helps to account for the fact that the
12Information on obligational authority and procurement spending comes from the United States Department of
Defense: Office of the Comptroller (2010). Obligational authority was chosen over budgetary authority and outlays
for a variety of reasons. First, it captures the liabilities that the military actually incurs in a given year, whereas
budgetary authority may include funds that are never actually spent. Outlays represent actual payments made in a
given year. However, these figures may actually represent payments for liabilities incurred several years ago. This
may be the case with large projects that are to be completed and delivered over the course of several years.
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influence exercised may vary across spending categories. Total branch spending encompasses a
wide variety of categories, such as operations and maintenance, housing, construction, benefits,
etc. Military leaders might prioritize certain spending areas over other and direct their efforts to
obtaining additional funds for those particular categories. Procurement provides a useful alterna-
tive category for the purposes of this analysis since military leaders should seek to acquire newer
weapons systems and technologies in order to more effectively compete with their military rivals
and to be better able to complete their assigned missions.
*** Figure 2 about here ***
I employ the aggregate values for each spending category rather than change values for a few
important reasons. First, when discussing military spending we often speak in terms of level,
making aggregate values more intuitive than changes when generating and discussing predicted
values. Second, using a change variable imposes a coefficient of 1 on the influence of the previous
year’s spending, whereas using aggregate values and including a lagged dependent variable relaxes
this constraint. The lagged variable also helps us to more directly control for the influence of
the previous year’s spending. Figures 2a and 2b show the patterns in obligational authority and
procurement spending, respectively, over time. While broad patterns of spending are similar across
branches, there is also substantial variation. Particularly, there are points where spending on one
branch increases while spending on others decreases, and in other cases spending priorities on
particular branches seem to trade places.
In addition to the centrality measures described above, there are other variables that are theo-
retically important and used for controls in the analysis. Given the hypotheses outlined above, I
use a dummy variable identifying whether or not the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff came
from the observed branch in a given year. This will help to determine whether or not the Chair-
man’s position exerts an independent effect on a branch’s influence and serves as an additional
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means of evaluating expectations derived from bureaucratic politics theory.13 To account for in-
stitutional changes that may affect the influence of military leaders, I include a dummy variable
for the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This variable is coded 1 for each observation that occurs after the
passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
Dummy variables are included in the analysis to account for the possibility that each branch of
the military differs in some systematic way from the other two branches. The Army and the Navy,
having been established long before the Air Force, might be expected to exercise greater influence.
Alternatively, the Navy might have more money than the Army as a result of the materials and
supplies that it requires generally costing more. The dummy variables included are for the Army
and the Air Force.14
I also control for other factors that may be associated with spikes in military spending. A
dummy variable is included which identifies each year that the United States is engaged in a ma-
jor war. This will control for increases in spending that are the result of wartime conditions.15
Aside from wartime periods, the Reagan administration also saw a significant increase in military
spending across all budget categories. I include a dummy variable to capture these effects.
Several scholars have argued that Democrats and Republicans have different preferences re-
lated to military spending (. Isaacson & Thomas 1986, Fordham 2002) To account for the influ-
ence of the divergent preferences of Republicans and Democrats over defense-related issues, I
include two variables that identify whether or not the presidency and Congress are controlled by
Democrats. The presidency is coded 1 for every observation in which the president is a Democrat,
and the Democratic Congress variable is coded 1 for every year in which both houses of Congress
13The timing with which an acting Chairman would step down and be replaced has changed over the years. Most
Chairmen assume their duties at the beginning of October, but many (8 of 17) were appointed earlier in the year. To
account for these changes I code each individual’s first year as Chairman to be the first year in which they served at
least 4 months in the position.
14The Air Force dummy is included in place of the Navy dummy to make interpretation of an Air Force-specific
time variable easier.
15This variable is coded 1 during Korea, the Vietnam War, the first Gulf War, and for the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq (Sarkees & Wayman 2010).
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are under Democratic control.
To capture any temporal trends, I include a variable to account for the potential impact of time
on spending. As the literature has indicated, politicians have, over the years, expressed different
preferences when it came to the best ways to pursue America’s global military commitments.
During the early years of the Cold War, Republicans tended to favor less expensive strategic forces.
Given that the Air Force had a monopoly on the delivery of nuclear weapons in the early years of
the Cold War, and that technological developments later enabled the other branches to compete
more effectively in this area, we should expect time to have a unique negative effect for the Air
Force. Thus I include an Air Force-specific time variable to capture this trend.
Similarly, I interact the partisan variables with the time variable. Several scholars have noted
that the preferences of Democrats and Republicans over matters related to national security and
defense policy have shifted over time (Trubowitz 1998, Cronin & Fordham 1999). These studies
have found that Democrats tended to be more supportive of internationalist policies in the early
years of the Cold War, and Republicans less so. This pattern changes in the mid-1960s to find
Republicans more supportive of internationalist policies than Democrats. Consequently, which
party controls each branch of government should play an important role in determining levels of
defense expenditures.
Finally, studies of defense spending often incorporate a variable accounting for the potential
impact of deficit spending. This variable is intended to capture the additional flexibility that deficit
spending can provide in terms of allowing greater levels of military spending than would otherwise
be possible. To account for these effects I include deficit spending as a percentage of GDP (Office
of Management and Budget 2010).
Analysis
Before discussing the results of the analyses, there are a two points that should be made. First, the
variables for centrality and the CJCOS are lagged by two time periods. Marra (1985, 369) provides
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a brief discussion of the timing associated with the Department of Defense budget process. Marra
notes that work on the budget for a given fiscal year starts 15–18 months before the beginning of
that fiscal year. Consequently, a two-year lag on the centrality variables is appropriate given the
fact that military leaders are going to be most involved in the budgeting process at the early stages,
and whatever influence they are able to exert may not manifest itself until several months later.
Second, the variables accounting for the influence of Congress and the president are not lagged.
The typical approach to modeling defense expenditures usually lags these variables by one time
period. This approach is intended to reflect the basic budgeting process wherein proposed budgets
are submitted to Congress—which typically occur several months before the onset of the fiscal
year for which the budget will apply. However, many scholars have ignored the fact that the
officially recorded defense spending figures for a given fiscal year can be quite misleading. It is
very common for supplementary spending packages to be passed after the beginning of a given
fiscal year. These supplementary appropriations are subsequently recorded as a part of the fiscal
year for which they were appropriated, even if the fiscal year has already begun, and it is not
uncommon for there to be multiple supplemental bills. Thus, a significant portion of the change
between time t and time t − 1 may actually be the result of supplemental spending during time t,
which suggests a slightly different causal process to be at work in terms of the influence of political
actors.
This practice is utilized often, especially during times of war. During 2003 Senate debates on an
amendment to limit such supplemental appropriations for the Iraq and Afghan wars, Senator Chris
Dodd (D-CT) expressed his belief that the Bush administration’s defense budget estimates were
deliberately underestimated to mask the true cost of American military operations (Government
Printing Office 2003). Even during the Cold War, supplemental spending packages during wartime
sometimes exceeded the amounts provided through the usual budget process (Daggett 2006). How-
ever, this practice is common even during peacetime. Supplemental defense authorization bills
have been passed at least once per year since 1981, and for non-trivial amounts. Often times such
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bills will authorize an additional $10–$20 billion in supplemental funds (Government Accountabil-
ity Office 2008). This kind of additional funding can also come from less obvious sources—the
Department of Defense also received $500 million in supplemental appropriations in the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina (Lake & Chite 2005).
Given their structure, most models of defense expenditures examine the changes in defense
spending from a previous year—either by using a change dependent variable or a lagged depen-
dent variable. Many scholars examining a variety of budgetary issues have argued, the previous
year’s budget serves as a starting point from which additions or cuts may be made (for examples,
see Marra 1985, Berry & Lowery 1990, Hartley & Russett 1992). Thus the variation that we are
explaining from year to year is often much smaller than the total amounts being spent. The average
change in a branch’s obligational authority in the data set is approximately $1.7 billion. Consid-
ering that these supplemental spending packages often amount to several billion dollars, there is
ample reason to believe that these dynamics are influencing changes seen in the data. Furthermore,
unlike military leaders political leaders can intervene in the budgeting process at nearly any point
in time. I use the partisan control of the presidency and Congress at time t to capture this late-stage
intervention by political leaders.16
Results and Discussion
Table 1 shows the results for the six models run. Models 1–3 use the obligational authority de-
pendent variable, while models 4–6 use procurement spending. Panel-corrected standard errors
were used in all models to control for spatial correlation between branches (Beck & Katz 1995).
16As a robustness check I have run the models by lagging the Democratic Congress and Democratic President
variables by one year. The coefficients on centrality, CJCOS, and the CJCOS interaction with Goldwater-Nichols all
remain highly significant and in the expected directions in the obligational authority model. The centrality interaction
term falls out of significance in the procurement model as well. However, in the obligational authority and procure-
ment models, the substantive effect of the Democratic Congress variable weakens considerably, and fails to reach
significance. Given previous research on partisan preferences on foreign policy issues (see Trubowitz 1998, Cronin &
Fordham 1999, Fordham 2002) there is serious reason to question this weakened and insignificant finding. I argue that
this indicates that the causal process captured by the un-lagged specification is providing a more accurate picture of
what is driving spending patterns, given that I am also controlling for the influence of military leaders during the early
stages of the budgeting process, as well as the influence of the previous year’s budget.
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A lagged dependent variable was also included to control for the influence of the previous year’s
spending. Models 1 and 4 provide the results of the base models. The control variables generally
perform as expected. Results indicate that the Army receives, on average, less money in both cate-
gories than the Navy, while the Air Force receives more money. However, the nuclear technology
variable is negative and significant in all models, indicating that the Air Force’s budget does decline
as time goes on. The war and Reagan variables are both positive and significant in all models, as
we expect. The party variables also perform as we expect. Democrats are inclined to spend more
during the early years of the Cold War, but the interaction variables indicate that Democrats spend
less on the military over time. This is in line with the findings of Cronin & Fordham (1999) who
have examined the changes in Republican and Democratic preferences over foreign policy.
*** Table 1 about here ***
Models 2 and 5 shows the effect of the consolidated centrality measure on obligational authority
and procurement spending. Although neither the constituent centrality measure nor the interaction
term are significant in the obligational authority model, the interaction effect between the two is
significant at the .1 level.17 Similarly, the interaction effect of centrality in the post-Goldwater
period is positive and significant at the .05 level for the procurement regression in model 5. In both
spending categories, controlling a greater share of the military hierarchy seems to exert a positive
and significant effect in the post-Goldwater period, indicating that the institutional changes that
the Goldwater-Nichols Act imposed did in fact lead to changes in the ability of service members
to influence spending decisions.
However, as previously hypothesized the effects of particular positions may exert their own
independent effect on military spending priorities. To account for this possibility I recalculate the
centrality measure used in models 2 and 5 to exclude the CJCOS. This new centrality measure only
includes the CINCs and the Vice-Chairman. I then run models 2 and 5 again, this time substituting
17In calculating these joint tests I follow Wooldridge’s (2003, 329) approach.
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the new centrality variable and the CJCOS dummy variable, along with their respective interaction
terms. These results are shown in models 3 and 6.18
The results from these models generate some interesting results. First, the coefficients on the
CJCOS variable in model 3 is positive and significant at the .05 level in the pre-Goldwater pe-
riod, and negative and significant in the post-Goldwater period. The interaction effect in model
3, indicating that holding the CJCOS position is associated with an approximate loss of $6.7 bil-
lion dollars in the post-Goldwater period as compared to before, is significant at the .05 level as
well. These results support the hypotheses regarding the Chairman’s unique independent effect
on spending, while also suggesting that the Goldwater-Nichols Act made the Chairman a less in-
fluential position as compared to the pre-Goldwater period by removing the Chairman from the
operational chain of command. However, it does not appear that the CJCOS has had any dis-
cernible impact on procurement spending in either time period. Caution should be exercised in
interpreting these results, however, as the Chairman’s influence may have increased in other, less
tangible, areas.
Second, the centrality coefficients in both models 3 and 6 are highly significant and negative,
indicating that the greater a branch’s representation and power within the military hierarchy, the
less money they receive. This result is quite plausible in the pre-Goldwater period if we consider
that service chiefs may be exerting a much greater influence on budgetary decisions and are bal-
ancing against whichever service begins to grow too powerful. Alternatively, the interaction terms
are both positive and highly significant. The interaction effects in both models are also positive,
but neither interaction effect is statistically significantly different from zero. However, the lack of
significance on these interaction effects only indicates that the effect is not statistically significantly
different from 0. In addition to the impact of centrality at any given time, we are also interested in
learning something about the difference between the two time periods.
18I have also run all models with no interaction terms. As should be expected given the hypotheses regarding the
changing effects of these variables, the variables of interest do not exhibit a significant impact on spending.
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*** Figure 3 about here ***
In order to better grasp the impact that centrality has on spending, further explanation is re-
quired. Figure 3 shows the predicted effect of centrality on obligational authority in the pre- and
post-Goldwater periods based on model 3. The graph ranges from .35 to .95 to reflect the range of
the centrality variable that is observed in the data. The vertical line is set at .59 the mean value for
centrality in the data. Control variables were all held at their respective means or modes, with the
Army branch dummy serving as the active category. Accordingly, the lagged dependent variable
was held at the Army’s mean value.
Although the magnitudes on the centrality coefficients may seem striking, they are largely
meaningless without additional contextualization. The average change in centrality from one year
to the next is .07, which equates to a loss of approximately $2.2 billion in obligational authority
during the pre-Goldwater period and an approximate gain of $53 million during the post-Goldwater
period. Substantively, the impact of such a shift depends on the relative power of positions held and
the number of available positions. Assuming an average power equal to 1, a change in centrality
of .07 would roughly equate to a branch gaining or losing one position in the current military
structure. For any given year, a branch may expect to gain or lose somewhere in the range of $53
to $158 million dollars in the post-Goldwater period, assuming a gain or loss of between one and
three positions.
It should also be noted that the time variable is held constant at the sample’s median value
of 31 (1979) in generating the predicted values for both the pre- and post-Goldwater periods.
Consequently, the results indicate that, despite the Goldwater-Nichols variable’s negative sign, for
most levels of centrality a branch receives more money in the post-Goldwater period than before,
and that this effect is not the result of changes stemming from simple temporal factors associated
with the calculation of each line. At the average value of centrality the difference between the two
time periods is approximately $6.4 billion greater in the post-Goldwater period.
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As briefly mentioned above, one possible explanation for the negative coefficient on the cen-
trality variables for the pre-Goldwater period is that the chiefs of staff coordinate efforts in an
attempt to balance against any branch that gains a disproportionate share of important command
positions. Prior to 1986, the service chiefs were more actively involved in operational issues. To
some extent this fact is reflected by the changes in the effect of the CJCOS variable in the models
above. The lack of significance on the interaction effects in these models could indicate that the
service chiefs are still able to influence spending, but that CINCs are now better able to exert their
own balancing influence against the service chiefs through their control of command positions
in the field, thus nullifying the previous dynamic and possibly allowing for some marginal gains
from each field position that branch comes to control. It may also indicate that, despite increasing
the power of the CINCs, their position as commanders of forces drawn from all three branches
makes them slightly less parochial. Furthermore, the significance of the centrality variables, while
controlling for the influence of political parties, supports the expectation that the composition of
the American military hierarchy exerts an independent influence on military spending priorities.
The two-year lag on the centrality variables, and the fact that the appointment of military officials
often occurs in a sometimes random and staggering manner, further suggests that these actors not
serving as mere proxies for the preferences of the political actors that have appointed them.
Conclusions
The results of the preceding study provide a few important findings. First, while several studies
have examined the role of domestic political competition and conflict in shaping foreign policy
decisions, few have sought to account for the role of military officials in this process. Although few
scholars would argue that military leaders do not play an important role in shaping foreign policy,
attempts to incorporate these actors into our quantitative models have been few. Consequently this
study represents one more step in the development of a better understanding of the role played
by domestic political interests in determining state behavior at the international level by moving
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beyond the initial layer of elected officials and explicitly accounting for the influence of military
leadership.
Second, the results of this study further indicate that the ability of military officials to influence
policy outcomes is affected by the institutions governing civil-military relations, as well as the
relations between high-ranking military officials. Indeed, the Goldwater-Nichols Act appears to
have had important consequences in determining which actors were able to influence defense pol-
icy, and how much influence they were able exert. The implications of these findings are important
as they suggest that power amongst America’s military leaders has been somewhat decentralized
since the passage of this legislation. While this may not seem terribly significant at first glance,
it is important to keep in mind that this legislation represents the greatest effort to reorganize the
structure of the American military since the National Security Act of 1947. Any serious attempt
at reorganizing the organization of the American military takes an enormous amount of time and
political capital. Imposing significant changes on the ways in which military leaders can influ-
ence policy is not something that can be done overnight, but is something that takes decades to
accomplish, and is likely to have implications for decades to follow.
Finally, these results also speak to the subjectivity of national security concerns. The notion that
military leaders will use their control of the military’s broader organizational hierarchy to benefit
their particular branch suggests something important about the degree to which national security
and foreign policy can be conceptualized in terms of common strategic interests. Although the
idea of divergent preferences over national security policy is not new, this study underscores this
concept by providing some evidence of the parochial nature of America’s military leadership. If
even those individuals charged with the planning and execution of the state’s defense are inclined
to pursue more narrow interests, then it seems all the more likely that politicians may be prone
to significantly varied conceptualizations of just what constitutes the “national interest.” The exis-
tence of similar variation amongst military leaders suggests that the processes shaping preferences
over national security issues may be far more complex than we might expect.
29
References
Allison, Graham & Morton Halperin. 1972. “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy
Implications.” World Politics 24:40–79.
Allison, Graham & Philip Zelikow. 1999. Essence of Decision. Kindle 2nd ed. Longman.
Allison, Graham T. 1969. “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” The American
Political Science Review 63(3):689–718.
Arena, Philip & Glenn Palmer. 2009. “Politics or the Economy? Domestic Correlates of Dispute
Involvement in Developed Democracies.” International Studies Quarterly 53:955–975.
Bacevich, Andrew J. 2004. American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy.
Harvard University Press.
Bacevich, Andrew J. 2009. The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism. Holt
Paperbacks.
Beck, Nathaniel & Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. “What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series Cross-
Section Data.” American Political Science Review 89(3):634–647.
Berry, William D. & David Lowery. 1990. “An Alternative Approach to Understanding Budgetary
Trade-offs.” American Journal of Political Science 34(3):671–705.
Betts, Richard K. 1991. Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. Columbia University Press.
Bourne, Christopher M. 1998. “Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.” Joint
Forces Quarterly .
Clark, David H. 2003. “Can Strategic Interaction Divert Diversionary Behavior? A Model of U.S.
Conflict Propensity.” The Journal of Politics 65(4):1013–1039.
Clark, David H. & Timothy Nordstrom. 2005. “Democratic Variants and Democratic Variance:
How Domestic Constraints Shape Interstate Conflict.” The Journal of Politics 67(1):250–270.
Clifford, Clark. 1991. Counsel to the President. New York: Random House.
Cronin, Patrick & Benjamin O. Fordham. 1999. “Timeless Principles or Today’s Fashion? Testing
the Stability of the Linkage between Ideology and Foreign Policy in the Senate.” The Journal
of Politics 61(4):967–98.
Daggett, Stephen. 2006. Military Operations: Precedents for Funding Contingency Operations in
Regular or in Supplemental Appropriations Bills. Technical report Congressional Research
Services.
Epstein, David & Sharyn O’Halloran. 1999. Delegating powers: A Transaction Cost Politics
Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers. Cambridge Univ Press.
30
Faust, Katherine. 1997. “Centrality in affiliation networks.” Social Networks 19(2):157 – 191.
Fordham, Benjamin. 1998. “Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-
1994.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(4):418–439.
Fordham, Benjamin O. 2002. “Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the Allocation of
American Cold War Military Spending.” The Journal of Politics 64(1):63–88.
Franks, Tommy R. 2004. American Soldier. Harper Collins.
Government Accountability Office. 2008. Supplemental Appropriations: Opportunities Exist to
Increase Transparency and Provide Additional Controls. Technical report United States Gov-
ernment Accountability Office.
Government Printing Office. 2003. Congressional Record. In Congressional Record: Proceedings
and Debates of the 108th Congress, First Session. Vol. 149 Government Printing Office
p. 18478.
Haas, Peter M. 1992. “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordina-
tion.” International Organization 46(1):1–35.
Halperin, Morton, Priscilla Clapp & Arnold Kanter. 2007. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Pol-
icy. 2nd ed. Brookings Institution Press.
Hammond, Thomas H. 1986. “Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Poli-
tics.” American Journal of Political Science 30(2):379–420.
Hartley, Thomas & Bruce Russett. 1992. “Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who Governs
Military Spending in the United States?” American Political Science Review 86(4):905–915.
Isaacson, Walter & Evan Thomas. 1986. The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made.
Simon and Schuster.
Kolaczyk, Eric D. 2009. Statistical Analysis of Network Data. Springer Series in Statistics Springer
Science.
Lake, Jennifer E. & Ralph M. Chite. 2005. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Hurricane
Katrina Relief. Technical report Congressional Research Services.
Leblang, David & Steve Chan. 2003. “Explaining Wars Fought by Established Democracies: Do
Institutional Constraints Matter?” Political Research Quarterly 56(4):285–400.
Lowi, Theodore. 1963. Bases in Spain. In American Civil-Military Decisions, ed. Harold Stein.
University of Alabama Press pp. 667–702.
Marra, Robin F. 1985. “A Cybernetic Model of the US Defense Expenditure Policymaking Pro-
cess.” International Studies Quarterly 29(4):357–384.
31
Milner, Helen V. & Dustin H. Tingley. 2010. “The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: Amer-
ican Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid.” Economics and Politics 22(2):200–232.
Moe, Terry M. 1989. The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure. In Can the Government Govern?, ed.
John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson. The Brookings Institution pp. 267–329.
Nagl, John. 2002. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. University of Chicago Press.
Office of Management and Budget. 2010. Historical Tables: Budget of the US Government. Tech-
nical report United States Office of Management and Budget.
Office of the Federal Register. Various Years. United States Government Manual. Technical report
National Archives and Records Administration.
Opsahl, Tore, Filip Agneessens & John Skvoretz. 2010. “Node Centrality in Weighted Networks:
Generalizing Degree and Shortest Paths.” Social Networks 32:245–251.
Reiter, Dan & Erik R. Tillman. 2002. “Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints on the
Democratic Initiation of Conflict.” The Journal of Politics 64(3):819–826.
Rhodes, Edward. 1994. “Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter?: Some Disconfirming Findings from
the Case of the U.S. Navy.” World Politics 47(1):1–41.
Sarkees, Meredeith Reid & Frank Wayman. 2010. Resort to War: 1816–2007. CQ Press.
Schmitt, Erick. 2004. “Other Services Eyed by Army for Recruiting.” New York Times .
URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/09/us/other-services-eyed-by-army-for-
recruiting.html
Shanker, Thom. 2011. “Warning Against Wars Like Iraq and Afghanistan.” The New York Times .
URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/world/26gates.html
Stevenson, Charles A. 2008. “Underlying Assumptions of the National Security Act of 1947.”
Joint Force Quarterly 48(1):129–133.
Trask, Roger R. & Alfred Goldberg. 1997. The Department of Defense, 1947-1997: Organization
and Leaders. Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Trubowitz, Peter. 1998. Defining the National Interest. The University of Chicago Press.
United States Department of Defense: Office of the Comptroller. 2010. Department of Defense:
National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2011. Technical report Department of Defense,
Office of the Comptroller.
Wasserman, Stanley & Katherine Faust. 1994. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applica-
tions. Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, George C. 2000. This War Really Matters. 1st ed. CQ Press.
32
Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at War. Simon and Schuster.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2003. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Thompson South
Western.
33
Table 1: Regressions Predicting Obligational Authority and Procurement
Models 1–3 Models 4–6
Obligational Authority Procurement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Centrality 3030.0 -32072.4* 192.1 -17052.2*
(4423.5) (10798.8) (2526.2) (6310.7)
Centrality * Goldwater 9502.5 32822.4* 10003.8* 24434.2*
(7782.6) (12749.9) (4476.7) (7400.1)
CJCOS 3690.5* 1276.3
(1644.4) (958.6)
CJCOS * Goldwater -6746.2* -812.1
(2813.2) (1604.2)
Army -1057.0 -1295.8 -842.9 -4372.0* -4670.7* -4362.1*
(1557.1) (1669.5) (1612.6) (1238.1) (1256.0) (1281.0)
Air Force 7642.9* 8751.0* 13533.5* 3517.1* 4064.3* 6147.2*
(2577.6) (2730.9) (2967.6) (1653.4) (1713.7) (1883.8)
Nuclear Tech -199.5* -220.2* -325.2* -96.99* -103.1* -142.7*
(70.16) (74.85) (78.57) (45.81) (47.38) (50.43)
Year 819.7* 746.4* 730.2* 408.9* 328.4* 313.4*
(179.4) (174.4) (173.2) (111.5) (104.6) (102.8)
Goldwater-Nichols -4183.1 -8386.8 -12947.6* -2923.8 -7834.9* -10822.1*
(4715.0) (6370.0) (6501.3) (2850.3) (3707.4) (3785.3)
War 8048.8* 7377.3* 8093.8* 3176.7 2827.9 3050.3*
(2800.3) (2638.8) (2612.8) (1705.0) (1564.9) (1536.7)
Reagan 17842.9* 21975.7* 26557.9* 11345.1* 15801.6* 18455.4*
(4801.9) (5587.5) (5761.6) (2934.5) (3304.2) (3375.6)
Dem. President 14912.7* 17605.5* 16993.0* 9170.7* 10821.3* 10645.1*
(5112.3) (4978.2) (4868.7) (3057.2) (2924.3) (2833.2)
Dem. President * Year -442.2* -515.7* -499.3* -223.2* -265.9* -262.9*
(150.5) (147.1) (143.5) (90.92) (86.74) (83.98)
Dem. Congress 20368.3* 21825.9* 23305.4* 14050.9* 15599.0* 16752.8*
(7754.8) (7531.8) (7395.3) (4847.9) (4582.1) (4476.5)
Dem. Congress * Year -435.7* -437.3* -426.9* -265.7* -266.1* -269.0*
(193.9) (182.2) (178.9) (120.4) (110.3) (107.4)
Deficit as % of GDP 937.7 963.5 1131.4 490.2 554.7 685.6
(715.9) (683.6) (679.0) (432.0) (400.4) (394.0)
LDV 0.781* 0.767* 0.755* 0.698* 0.677* 0.680*
(0.0535) (0.0531) (0.0516) (0.0663) (0.0628) (0.0622)
Constant -11721.9 -13464.1 4786.2 -9301.0 -9057.0 -951.7
(8102.0) (8431.2) (9169.6) (4994.9) (5058.5) (5682.9)
Observations 183 180 180 183 180 180
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses
* p ≤ 0.05
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Figure 2: Obligational Authority and Procurement Spending by Branch, 1948–2009 (in millions
of constant 2000 dollars.
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Figure 3: Predicted effect of centrality and Goldwater-Nichols Act on obligational authority (in
millions of constant 2000 dollars).
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